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Abstract 
 
This study examines the impact of ownership structure on reinsurance decisions in the 
Chinese property casualty insurance industry.  The evidence shows that foreign insurers have 
higher reinsurance demand than domestic insurers.  Specifically, foreign insurers are more 
likely to purchase volunteer reinsurance.  More important, foreign insurers are associated with a 
higher percentage of facultative reinsurance ratios than domestic insurers.  Implementing the 
compulsory reinsurance ratio in the Chinese insurance market before 2006 is inefficient.  Finally, 
regulation of compulsory reinsurance ratio affected the reinsurance demand in 2006.  For 
example, insurers with a 10 percent compulsory reinsurance ratio in 2004 had significantly 
different reinsurance demand from that of insurers without compulsory reinsurance after 2006.  
The overall results of this study indicate that ownership structure and other characteristics of 
firms’ significantly affect the demand for reinsurance.   
 
Keywords: Reinsurance demand, ownership structure, compulsory reinsurance, voluntary 
reinsurance, facultative reinsurance, treaty reinsurance  
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Ownership Structure and Reinsurance Decisions: Evidence from the Property 
Casualty Insurance Industry in China 
1.  Introduction 
This paper examines the reinsurance decisions in the Chinese property casualty 
insurance industry.  I focus on decision between compulsory (statutory) reinsurance 
and volunteer reinsurance.  I also examine the effect of treaty reinsurance on 
reinsurance decisions compared with that of facultative reinsurance.  Reinsurance is a 
traditional risk transfer tool in the insurance industry.  Thus, the decision of 
reinsurance is an important issue regarding insurer solvency.   
The Chinese insurance industry has been rapidly expanding.  The total number 
of direct premiums for property casualty insurance in China ranked sixth worldwide in 
2011 (Table 1).  When China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the 
Chinese government reduced restrictions on the entry of foreign insurers to the Chinese 
market.  More important, the tight regulation of policies by the government protected 
domestic insurance companies before 2001.  In 2012, China had 60 property casualty 
insurers including 39 domestic insurers and 21 foreign insurers.  The Chinese 
insurance industry is a particularly interesting issue because insurers are of two types: 
domestic insurers and foreign insurers.  When China joined the WTO, domestic 
insures benefited from considerable involvement by competent foreign insurers, who 
have extensive expertise and excellent reputation.   
Previous studies have investigated the relation between organizational structure 
and reinsurance demand (Mayers and Smith, 1981; Hansmann, 1985; Hoerger et al., 
1990; Mayers and Smith, 1990; Adiel, 1996; Garven and Lamm-Tennant, 2003; Cole 
and McCullough, 2006; Cole et al., 2007; Powell and Sommer, 2007; Cummins et al., 
2008; Wang et al., 2008; Garven and Grace, 2011; Ho et al., 2013).  For example, 
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Mayer and Smith (1990) suggest that the type of organizational is related to 
reinsurance demand and that mutual insurers purchase more reinsurance than stock 
insurers.  By contrast, Cole and McCullough (2006) find that stock insurers purchase 
more reinsurance than mutual insurers.  These findings suggest that empirical 
evidence on the relation between organizational structure and reinsurance decision is 
inconclusive.   
Studies have rarely examined ownership structure and reinsurance demand (Wu 
et al., 2010; Zhao and Wu, 2010).  For example, Wu et al. (2010) and Zhao and Wu 
(2010) find that no significant relation arguably exists between ownership forms 
(domestic insurers or foreign insurers) and reinsurance demand.  Skipper (1997) 
suggests that foreign insurers have a potentially constructive role in the insurance 
markets of transition economies and developing countries.  Because foreign insurance 
companies are often a part of larger international insurance professional groups, their 
risk pooling activities are helpful, particularly they offer great pricing.  Moreover, 
Skipper (1997) also argued that in an ideal world, complete freedom is extended to 
insurers and reinsurers to provide cross-border insurance services.  Therefore, the 
question of whether the more competitive service quality of foreign insurers more 
substantially affects reinsurance decisions than the service quality of domestic insurers 
is a valuable research topic.  This study sheds light on this issue in the context of an 
emerging insurance market. 
 This paper examines the impact of ownership structure and firms’ 
characteristics on reinsurance decisions in the property casualty insurance industry in 
China.  Foreign insurers have higher reinsurance demand than domestic insurers. 
Specifically, foreign insurers purchase reinsurance from volunteer reinsurance.  More 
important, foreign insurers are associated with a higher percentage of facultative 
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reinsurance ratios than domestic insurers.  Finally, the implementing the compulsory 
reinsurance ratio in the Chinese insurance market had been inefficient until 2006.  
The regulation of without compulsory reinsurance ratio in 2006 influenced the 
reinsurance demand.  For example, insurers with a 10 percent compulsory reinsurance 
ratio in 2004 had a significantly different reinsurance demand compared with insurers 
after 2006.  The overall results of this study indicate that ownership structure and 
several characteristics of firms’ significantly affect the demand for reinsurance. 
This study differs from previous studies in several ways.  First, to the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the effect of ownership structure and 
reinsurance decision on the choice between compulsory reinsurance and voluntary 
reinsurance in Chinese property casualty insurance industry.  Moreover, treaty 
reinsurance and facultative reinsurance are compared.  Second, little evidence of 
previous studies on the relation between ownership structure and reinsurance demand 
do not exists (e.g. Wu et al., 2010; Zhao and Wu, 2010).  However, I find a positive 
relation between foreign insurers and reinsurance demand.  Third, this paper 
investigates whether the regulations have significantly changed since 2006, given that 
implementing of the compulsory reinsurance ratio in the Chinese insurance market was 
inefficient before that year.  Finally, this study examines whether the regulation of 
without compulsory reinsurance ratio affected the reinsurance demand after 2006.  
Thus, this paper complements existing literature by providing an alternative 
perspective.  
The paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 provides a background on 
regulation in the Chinese insurance market.  Section 3 discusses the hypothesis 
development.  The data and methodology are described in Section 4.  Section 5 
summarizes the statistical and empirical results.  Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Background of regulation in Chinese reinsurance market 
In 1988, China implemented compulsory reinsurance, which requires each 
insurer to cede 30% of its business to the People’s Insurance Company of China 
(PICC).  The reinsurance department of PICC manages all business concerning 
compulsory reinsurance.  In 1995, China’s first insurance law was ratified, lowering 
the percentage of compulsory reinsurance cession from 30% to 20%.  In 1996, PICC 
initiated reforms that created the People’s Insurance Reinsurance Company of China, 
also known as PICC Reinsurance, which was reorganized and renamed as the China 
Reinsurance Company in 1999.  Before 2003, the China Reinsurance Company was 
the only reinsurance company in the Chinese insurance market.   
According to the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC), upon the 
entry of China to the WTO in December 2001, foreign insurance companies were 
permitted to provide reinsurance services in the form of joint ventures, branches and 
subsidiaries.  In 2003, eight reinsurers had registered branches in China1.  For 
example, the Munich Reinsurance Company and the Swiss Reinsurance Company 
entered the Chinese reinsurance market in 2003 by setting up branches in Beijing, and 
the General Reinsurance Company followed by establishing its Shanghai Branch in 
2004.  Thus, since 2004, the reinsurance market has become more competitive.   
Under the leadership of CIRC, the regulation of the compulsory reinsurance 
cession ratio changed when China joined the WTO in 2001.  In particular, reinsurance 
requirements gradually phased out the 20 percent compulsory reinsurance ceded ratio 
within four years after China’s entry to the WTO.  Thus, the compulsory reinsurance 
cession ratio was reduced by 5 percent annually from 2003 to 20062.  In 2006, the 20 
                                                      
1 In 2011, there are 3 domestic reinsurance companies and 5 foreign reinsurance companies in China. 
2 The compulsory reinsurance cession ratio is 15%, 10%, 5% and 0% in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, 
respectively. 
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percent compulsory reinsurance cession ratio was eliminated entirely.  
In November 2007, CIRC issued a notification that required primary insurers to 
review their reinsurance plans annually.  In the selection of reinsurance companies, 
several criteria need to be met, including credit rating, solvency levels and registered 
capital.  For example, reinsurance treaty leaders should either be state-owned 
enterprises or have credit ratings not lower than A- by S&P, A.M. Best, or Fitch or A3 
by Moody’s (Huang and Tian, 2010).  In addition, according to the Regulations on the 
Administration of Reinsurance Business by CIRC (2005), insurers have to follow the 
solvency regulation on foreign reinsurers and the priority of reinsurance arrangement 
in the domestic insurance market.  The priority of reinsurance arrangements in the 
domestic insurance market was cancelled by the revised regulation in 2010.  Previous 
provisions on the Administration of Reinsurance Business, which were deliberated and 
adopted at the executive meeting of CIRC on April 12, 2010, were promulgated and 
enforced on July 1, 2010.   
3. Hypothesis Development  
This section develops three hypotheses on the effect of ownership structure on 
reinsurance demand.  
Ownership structure and compulsory reinsurance versus volunteer reinsurance  
Regulators in China place several restrictions on operations of insurers to 
protect the domestic insurance industry.  For example, CIRC Regulations on the 
Administration of Reinsurance Business specifies the compulsory (statutory) 
reinsurance ceded ratio to be ceded by domestic insurers (that is, China Reinsurance 
company).  Although compulsory reinsurance may be a harmful arrangement for 
reinsurance businesses in China’s rapidly developing insurance market, insurers have 
to cede compulsory reinsurance and to pay compulsory reinsurance cost based on 
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China’s regulation.  Therefore, compulsory reinsurance restrictions on reinsurance 
decision may not be significantly different.  I infer that there is no relation between 
ownership structure and compulsory reinsurance decision.  Conversely, volunteer 
reinsurance provides more choices for ceding with others insurers depending on 
reinsurance pricing, services quality and professional knowhow than compulsory 
reinsurance.   
Skipper (1997) suggests that liberalized insurance markets increase the 
efficiency of allocation of a country’s resources and that foreign insurers introduce 
sophisticated loss mitigation services to domestic insurance markets.  Foreign insurers 
also provide superior loss prevention and mitigation services to their policyholders.  
Sun (2003) argued that Chinese domestic insurance companies’ operating systems, 
financial strength, management, technology and expertise are not comparable to 
foreign insurance companies’.  Foreign insurers have valuable advantages in terms of 
financial strength, technology and management experience.  In sum, I infer that 
foreign insurers purchase more volunteer reinsurance than domestic insures, and thus 
propose the following hypothesis.     
Hypothesis 1a: There is no relation between ownership structure and compulsory 
reinsurance decision. 
Hypothesis 1b: Foreign insurers purchase more volunteer reinsurance than 
domestic insurers.   
 
Ownership structure and facultative reinsurance versus treaty reinsurance  
Reinsurance arrangements are of two basic types: treaty reinsurance and 
facultative reinsurance3.  An insurer is contractually bound to cede, and the reinsurer 
is bound to assume a specified portion of the insured risks by the primary insurer 
                                                      
3 According to Article 2 in Regulations on Administration of Reinsurance Business by CIRC, the 
definition of Treaty reinsurance is an insurer signs a contract in advance with other insurance company 
and agrees to cover reinsurance for the insurance business it is undertaking in a certain period through 
other insurance company.  Facultative reinsurance is an insurance company established under the 
approval of China insurance company that it shall cover reinsurance through the latter for the insurance 
business it is undertaking. 
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according to their reinsurance contract in the treaty reinsurance.  Treaty reinsurance is 
a normal preparatory reinsurance arrangement that depends on the prior reinsurance 
contract regardless of the ownership structure (i.e. foreign or domestic).  Therefore, 
there is no relation between ownership structure and treaty reinsurance.   
Facultative reinsurance requires negotiation for each insurance contract that is 
reinsured.  In facultative reinsurance, an insurer cedes and a reinsurer assumes all or 
part of the risk assumed by a specific reinsurance arrangement policy.  In contrast to 
treaty reinsurance, facultative reinsurance focuses on unusual risks, and insurers 
purchase reinsurance for individual risks when the treaty reinsurance contract is not 
covered.  Foreign insurers have international insurance knowledge, complete 
professional insurance services, underwriting and claim experiences or capacity for 
negotiating reinsurance cessions when ceding facultative reinsurance compared with 
domestic insurers.  Foreign insurers purchase a higher percentage of facultative 
reinsurance than domestic insurers on the basis of the discussion above.  Thus, the 
following hypothesis is offered. 
Hypothesis 2a: There is no relation between ownership structure and treaty 
reinsurance decision. 
Hypothesis 2b: Foreign insurers purchase a higher percentage of facultative 
reinsurance than domestic insurers.   
 
Effect of changes in regulation 
Before 2006, the reinsurance market in China had a high concentration of 
domestic insurers that these firms did not have proper incentives to enhance their 
reinsurance function.  For instance, China Reinsurance enjoys 20% compulsory 
cession.  With the annual decrease in compulsory reinsurance ratio by 5%, the 
reinsurance market gradually changed, implying that insurers gained more freedom to 
choose other insurers based on the firm’s insured risk and financial situation.  After 
2006, China still protected domestic insurance companies more than it did foreign 
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insurance companies.  Several regulations, constraints, and better regulatory 
environment in favor of domestic insurers may have resulted in the changes in the 
purchasing reinsurance behaviors of insurers since 2004.  Thus, insurance companies 
possibly had different demands for reinsurance when the compulsory reinsurance ratio 
was entirely eliminated by 2006.  This observation leads to the following hypothesis:    
Hypothesis 3: Insurance companies have changed their reinsurance demand after 
the ceded compulsory reinsurance ratio was entirely eliminated by 
2006.  
 
4. Data and Methodology 
This section discusses the data and methodology used in this study. 
Data 
Our sample consists of 51 Chinese property causality insurance companies and 
275 firm-years from 2004 to 2011, although the panel is unbalanced because not every 
firm exists for the entire sample period.  In this study, reinsurers are excluded from 
the sample to well capture the reinsurance demand, similar to the methodology used by 
Garven and Lamm-Tennant (2003) and Cole and McCullough (2006).  The 
reinsurance ratio is calculated as the reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of the direct 
premiums written and reinsurance assumed.  For the reinsurance ratio, analyzing the 
effect of compulsory reinsurance and volunteer reinsurance, as well as treaty 
reinsurance and facultative reinsurance, on the reinsurance demand has no clear 
significance.  Therefore, compulsory reinsurance ratio, volunteer reinsurance ratio, 
treaty reinsurance ratio and facultative reinsurance ratio are computed separately.  
The data for the calculation of reinsurance ratio, as well as the ownership type and the 
firms’ characteristics, are obtained from CIRC.  The effect of the change in regulation 
when the compulsory reinsurance ratio was entirely eliminated by 2006 is compared 
with that in 2004.  Three regressions were performed to analyze a particular year 
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under three subsamples: 2004, 2005 (prior to its implementation), and 2006-2011 
(following its implementation in 2006).  Further, the effect of the reinsurance demand 
on facultative reinsurance versus treaty reinsurance is examined, although ceded 
reinsurance only since 2008 is described.  Thus, the subsample from 2008 to 2011 is 
used to investigate the effects mentioned above. 
Methodology   
First, a regression model is employed for all samples to investigate the effect of 
ownership structure on demand for compulsory reinsurance and voluntary reinsurance.  
To discuss the impact of ownership structure on the reinsurance demand from treaty or 
facultative reinsurance in future detail, subsample data from 2008 to 2011 is employed.  
Subsequently, Hausman tests are used to determine whether fixed effect models or 
random effect models should be used, given that the sample is in the form of an 
unbalanced panel data.  The results of the Hausman Test suggest that random effects 
should be used for all analyses.  More important, reinsurance decisions can be 
determined by the regulations that eliminated compulsory reinsurance in 2006.  Then, 
Chow test is used to examine the effect on the three subsamples (i.e., 2004, 2005, and 
2006-2011) when the 20 percent compulsory reinsurance ratio was gradually phased 
out.   
Reinsurance demand analysis across ownership structure 
Regression is used to examine whether ownership structure and reinsurance 
demand are related when the characteristics of firms are controlled for.  The empirical 
model and variable descriptions are provided below.  
Reinsurance Demand Model 
ititititit leverageFinleverageBusRiskOwnershipratioins ___Re 43210  
itititititit utailLongHerfindahlROAexTaxnaLn  98765 _)( 
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itititititit utailLongHerfindahlROAexTaxnaLn  98765 _)( 
 
ititititit leverageFinleverageBusRiskOwnershipratiovolins ____Re 43210  
itititititit utailLongHerfindahlROAexTaxnaLn  98765 _)( 
 
ititititit leverageFinleverageBusRiskOwnershipratiotreins ____Re 43210  
itititititit utailLongHerfindahlROAexTaxnaLn  98765 _)( 
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Dependent variables 
itratio_insRe  (total reinsurance ratio) is measured as the ratio of reinsurance 
ceded divided by the sum of direct premiums written plus reinsurance assumed 
(Mayers and Smith, 1990; Garven and Lamm-Tennant, 2003; Cole and McCullough, 
2006,; Wang et al., 2008).4  Demand for reinsurance from compulsory reinsurance 
and voluntary reinsurance variables are separately discussed.  Reins_com_ratioit 
(Reinsurance from compulsory reinsurance ceded) is measured as compulsory 
reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct premiums written plus reinsurance 
assumed.  Reins_vol_ratioit (Reinsurance from volunteer reinsurance ceded) is 
measured as non-compulsory reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct premiums 
written plus reinsurance assumed.   
Chinese insurance companies provide disclosure of the reinsurance ceded types, 
                                                      
4 Cummins et al. (2008) suggests that reinsurance ratio is defined as the premiums ceded to non-affiliated reinsurers. 
In addition, an alternative measure of reinsurance is share of written premiums ceded to non-affiliated reinsurers. 
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namely, treaty reinsurance ceded and facultative reinsurance ceded, which are 
obtained from CIRC data from 2008.  Reins_tre_ratioit (Reinsurance from treaty 
reinsurance ratio) is measured as treaty reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of 
direct premiums written plus reinsurance assumed. Reins_fac_ratioit (Reinsurance 
from facultative reinsurance ratio) is measured as facultative reinsurance ceded 
divided by the sum of direct premiums written plus reinsurance assumed.  
Per_fac_reins_ratioit is percentage of facultative reinsurance ratio divided by the sum 
of facultative reinsurance ratio plus treaty reinsurance ratio. 
Independent Variables  
I classified independent variables into two categories: independent variables of 
interest and firms’ characteristics variables.  Independent variables of interest are 
further categorized into ownership structure variable, risk variable and leverage 
variables.  Ownershipit (Ownership structure) is the ownership type which is a binary 
variable that equals 1 if the firm is a foreign insurer, equals 0 otherwise (e.g., Wu et al., 
2010; Zhao and Wu, 2010).  itRisk , the proxy of risk is loss ratio.  The loss ratio is 
defined as the ratio of loss incurred divided by premiums earned (Zhao and Wu, 2010).  
There are two types of leverage ratio are discussed: business leverage and financial 
leverage, respectively.  Business_Leverageit (Business leverage) is defined as the ratio 
of premium divided by surplus (Hoerger et al., 1990; Garven and Lanm-Ternnant, 2003; 
Zhao and Wu, 2010; Shiu, 2011).  Financial_Leverageit (Financial leverage) is 
defined as the ratio of liability divided by assets (Garven and Lanm-Ternnant, 2003; 
Zhao and Wu, 2010).  
Firms’ characteristics variables 
Previous studies have documented a series of factors affecting reinsurance 
demand such as firm size, line of business concentration, tax effects (e.g., Mayers and 
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Smith, 1990; Garven and Lamm-Tennant, 2003; Cole and McCullough, 2006; Cole et 
al. 2007; Cummins et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2008; Zhao and Wu, 2010; Garven and 
Grace, 2011).  My regressions of reinsurance demand include these variables.  I 
define the firms’ characteristics variables as follows: Ln(na)it is proxy for firm size 
which is the natural logarithm of assets. itexTax_  is measured as the ratio of tax to 
total premium income (Zhao and Wu, 2010)；ROAit is return on assets.  Herfindahlit is 
line of business concentration as measured by the Herfindahl index = 2( / )iPW TPW , 
where iPW  is the value of written premiums in line i and TPW is the insurer’s total 
written premiums (Mayers and Smith, 1990; Garven and Lamm-Tennant, 2003 ; Zhao 
and Wu, 2010; Garven and Grace, 2011); ittailLong  (the percentage of line of 
long-tail business) is the percentage of premiums written in both enterprise property 
insurance lines and liability insurance lines to total premiums income. Finally, uit is an 
error term. 
5. Summary Statistics and Empirical Results 
This section first discusses summary statistics and then provides empirical 
results. 
5.1 Summary statistics 
This section summarizes the statistics, including the means, standard deviations, 
and minimum and maximum values of all variables.  The sample consists of 51 
property casualty insurers from 2004 to 2011, although the panel is unbalanced 
because not every firm exists for the entire sample period.  The mean reinsurance 
ratio is 27.3%, 2.5% of which comes from compulsory reinsurance and 24.7% from 
volunteer reinsurance.  Because reinsurance demand from facultative reinsurance or 
treaty reinsurance was recorded in individual insurer’s financial statements starting in 
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2008, the observations (N = 157) of facultative reinsurance ratio and treaty reinsurance 
ratio are less than all sample (N = 275).  The average of treaty reinsurance ratio and 
facultative reinsurance ratio are 17.4% and 5.9%, respectively.  The mean percentage 
of the facultative reinsurance ratio divided by the sum of the treaty reinsurance ratio 
plus facultative reinsurance ratio is 20%.  Overall, most means of the variables in 
Table 2 are similar to those in previous studies (Zhao and Wu, 2010; Wu et al., 2010). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients among all variables.  
Variance-Inflation Factors (VIFs) (Neter et al., 1985) are used to diagnose whether 
there is multicollinearity between variables.  The VIFs of all variables in the 
regressions are lower than 3.  Hence, the later regression results of independent 
variables are not likely to be inversely affected by the presence of multicollinearity.  
Table 3 shows that the ownership structure (ownershipit) is negatively related to firm 
size (ln(na)it) (-0.618, significant at less than one percent level), but firm size (ln(na)it) 
is positively related to financial leverage (Fin_leverageit)(0.674, significant at less than 
one percent level). 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
5.2  Regression Analysis and Discussions 
Table 4 presents the regression results of reinsurance demand from reinsurance 
ratio, compulsory reinsurance ratio and volunteer reinsurance ratio when the variables 
of the characteristics of firms are controlled for.  The dependent variables are the total 
reinsurance ratio, compulsory reinsurance ratio and volunteer reinsurance ratio, 
respectively.  The study focuses on compulsory reinsurance and volunteer reinsurance.  
Ownership structure is positively and significantly related to reinsurance demand, 
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although this variable is not significantly related to demand from compulsory 
reinsurance.  In particular, foreign insurers purchase more volunteer reinsurance than 
domestic insurers.  The possible reason is that all insurers are required to cede 
compulsory reinsurance by government regulations; thus, there is no relation between 
ownership structure and compulsory reinsurance.  However, foreign insurers possess 
more expertise and international experience and thus purchase more volunteer 
reinsurance than domestic insurers.  This result is consistent with Hypotheses 1a and 
1b. 
Property casualty insurance companies with a higher ROA ratio are associated 
with high reinsurance demand whether they opt for compulsory reinsurance or 
volunteer reinsurance.  Moreover, a large insurance company is associated with low 
demand for reinsurance, implying that larger insurers purchase less reinsurance.  
These results are consistent with the findings of Zhao and Wu (2010), who find that 
ROA is positively related to reinsurance demand, whereas firm size is negatively 
related to reinsurance demand.  The tax shield is negatively related to reinsurance 
demand, implying that tax shield benefits reduce reinsurance cost.  Risk (whose proxy 
of risk is loss ratio), business leverage, financial leverage and the percentage of a 
long-tail business line are not significantly related to reinsurance demand.   
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Table 5 shows the regression results of reinsurance demand from treaty 
reinsurance ratio, facultative reinsurance ratio and the percentage of facultative 
reinsurance ratio when controlling firms’ characteristics variables from 2008 to 2011.  
Since 2008, information on treaty reinsurance ceded and facultative reinsurance ceded 
has been listed in individual insurance company’s financial statement, as required by 
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CIRC.  The evidence shows that ownership structure is not related to reinsurance 
demand whether treaty reinsurance or facultative reinsurance is selected.  However, 
foreign insurers have a higher percentage of facultative reinsurance ratio in the sum of 
the treaty reinsurance ratio and facultative reinsurance ratio than domestic insurers 
after 2008 because of the following reasons.   
First, the market share of foreign insurers in the Chinese insurance market is 
limited.  Thus, the number of foreign insurers that sign any treaty reinsurance with 
other insurers may be lower than that of domestic insurers based on lacking of the 
previous long-term cooperation relation.  Second, according to the Regulations on the 
Administration of Reinsurance Business5, insurers shall prior issue an offer to insurers 
located in China when insurers ceded for treaty reinsurance or facultative reinsurance 
with other insurers before 20106.  Therefore, foreign insurers have a lower treaty 
reinsurance ratio than domestic insurers.  Third, foreign insurers have extensive 
professional experience and excellent insurance capacity in the international arena to 
evaluate risk and to cede facultative reinsurance and thus purchase a higher percentage 
of facultative reinsurance than of treaty reinsurance.  As mentioned above, foreign 
insurers have a higher percentage of facultative reinsurance ratios than domestic 
insurers.  These results support the Hypotheses 2a and 2b. 
Furthermore, business leverage (premium-to-surplus ratio) is negatively related 
to the treaty reinsurance ratio, because insurers with a high business leverage ratio 
have high underwriting risk from insured business lines.  The reinsurance company 
                                                      
5 According to Article 11 in Regulations on Administration of Reinsurance Business by CIRC (2005), 
direct insurance companies that are in the business of treaty reinsurance and facultative reinsurance shall 
prior issue an offer to insurance companies located in China while in accordance with the following 
stipulations: 1.The offer shall be issued to at least two professional reinsurance companies located in 
China; 2.The total shares ceded from the offer shall not be lower than 50% of the ceded business. 
6 On 30 June 2010, CIRC issued revised Provisions on the Administration of Reinsurance Business 
(2010 Provisions) that replaced the earlier 2005 Provisions: Abrogating the requirement that primary 
insurers, when arranging treaty reinsurance and facultative reinsurance, should provide prior to insurers 
in China. 
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may not be able to agree with several special business lines under the regular treaty 
reinsurance contract based on the individual business line scenario.  Thus, an insurer 
with high business leverage is associated with a lower treaty reinsurance ratio.  A 
large insurance company is negatively related to facultative reinsurance, implying that 
large insurers purchase less facultative reinsurance.  Finally, the tax shield is 
negatively related to reinsurance demand, implying that the tax shield benefits reduce 
reinsurance cost.  These results are similar Table 4. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Table 6 presents the results of reinsurance demand for reinsurance ratio in 2004 
and from 2006 to 2011.  The effect of the change in regulations on reinsurance 
demand in the two subsamples is investigated.  Models A and B show the results for 
the different subsamples: for the 2004 sample, with 10% compulsory reinsurance ratio, 
and for the 2006–2011 sample without compulsory reinsurance ratio.  OLS regression 
is used in Model A, because this model includes data for only one year (2004).  
Separate regressions were performed to investigate reinsurance demand in the 2004 
sample and the 2006-2011 sample.  Using without compulsory reinsurance data after 
2006 is to examine whether the implementation of the changes in regulations are 
efficient compared with that in the 10% ceded compulsory reinsurance period in 2004.  
All coefficients for each variable from were obtained from the regression result on 
reinsurance ratio after 2006.  Subsequently, the actual data for each variable in 2004 
were calculated by using all coefficients of prior regression result in 2006, yielding the 
prediction for the Reins ratioi,2004.  The predict Reins ratioi,2004 (0.258)7 is less than 
                                                      
7 The Predict Reins ratioi,2004=0.328+(0.181)Ownership i,2006-2011+(0.006)Risk i,2006-2011+ 
(-0.002)Bus_Leverage i,2006-2011+(-0.01)Fin_Leverage i,2006-2011+(-0.019)Ln(na) i,2006-2011+(-0.215)Tax_ex i 
i,2006-2011+(0.294)ROA i,2006-2011+(0.011)Herfindahli,2006-2011+(-0.016)Long-tail i,2006-2011 
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the actual reinsurance ratio (0.326).  This result shows that insurers enabled 
compulsory reinsurance decision to be managed more inefficiently in 2004 than after 
2006, when the regulation has changed.  China’s compulsory reinsurance ceded 
regulation is inefficiently implemented, resulting in the purchase of more reinsurance 
and increasing reinsurance cost compared with the period without compulsory 
reinsurance. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Table 7 presents the result of the reinsurance demand for reinsurance ratio, 
compulsory reinsurance and volunteer reinsurance in 2004 (when insurers had 10 
percent compulsory reinsurance) and from 2006 to 2011(when insurers had no 
compulsory reinsurance).  Chow test is used to investigate the effect of the change in 
structure (i.e. the change in regulation) on the reinsurance demand during the three 
regressions after 2006.  Consequently, reinsurance demand is significantly changed 
between 2004 and the period from 2006 to 2011(F = 1.720, significant at less than five 
percent level).  Likewise, compulsory reinsurance ratio has also changed significantly 
from 2004 to 2006-2011 (F = 6.630 significant at less than one percent level).  This 
result implies that the changes in China’s regulation in 2006 have significantly affected 
the reinsurance demand; in particular, the changes have affected compulsory 
reinsurance.  The results of the comparison between 2005 and 2006-20118 and 
between the 2004 and 20059 samples have been examined (not tabulated).  In sum, 
insurers with a 10 percent compulsory reinsurance ratio in 2004 (with 5 percent 
compulsory reinsurance ratio in 2005) have significantly different reinsurance 
                                                      
8 F = 4.880 significant at less than one percent level for compulsory reinsurance and others are not 
significantly. 
9 F = 2.29 significant at less than five percent level for compulsory reinsurance and others are not 
significantly. 
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decisions from those of insurers without compulsory reinsurance after 2006.  This 
result supports the Hypothesis 3.   
[Insert Table 7 here] 
6.  Conclusion 
The paper investigates the impact of ownership structure on reinsurance 
decisions in Chinese property casualty insurance industry.  In the last 20 years, the 
Chinese insurance market has rapidly expanded.  Chinese regulators have reduced 
restrictions on foreign insurers to encourage them to enter the Chinese market after 
China joined the WTO in 2001.  Thus, domestic insurance industry has faced severe 
competition after foreign insurers joined China’s insurance market.  Therefore, the 
relation between ownership structure and reinsurance demand is an interesting issue.  
Specifically, this study focuses on the effect of these variables on reinsurance decisions 
in choosing between compulsory and volunteer reinsurance and between treaty 
reinsurance and facultative reinsurance.  This paper sheds light on this issue in 
China’s emerging insurance market.  
The evidence shows that foreign insurers have higher reinsurance demand than 
domestic insurers.  Specifically, foreign insurers purchase more volunteer reinsurance 
than domestic insurers.  Likewise, foreign insurers are associated with a higher 
percentage of facultative reinsurance ratios than domestic insurers.  A possible reason 
is that foreign insurers have extensive expertise, excellent reputation, international 
insurance knowledge, complete professional insurance services, underwriting and 
claim experiences or capacity for negotiating reinsurance cession than domestic 
insurers.  Furthermore, the implementation of the compulsory reinsurance ratio in the 
Chinese reinsurance market was inefficient until 2006.  Finally, the changes in the 
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regulation of compulsory reinsurance ratio influenced the reinsurance demand in 2006.  
For example, insurers in 2004 with a 10 percent compulsory reinsurance ratio had 
significantly different reinsurance demand from that of insurers without compulsory 
reinsurance after 2006.  Overall, this study indicates that ownership structure and 
several firms’ characteristics significantly affect the reinsurance decisions. 
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Table 1 Top Ten Countries by P/C Direct Premiums Written in 2011 
 
Rank  Nonlife Premiums  Country  P/C Insurance 
Penetration 
P/C Insurance 
Density 
1  $667,107  U.S.  4.44% $2,126 
2  $131,292  Germany  4.26% $1,615 
3  $130,741  Japan  2.98% $1,026 
4  $109,486  U.K.  4.87% $1,737 
5  $98,359  France  4.44% $1,499 
6  $87,319  China  0.77% $65 
7  $79,722  Netherlands  11.30% $4,765 
8  $69,045  Canada  4.97% $2,013 
9  $55,426  Italy  3.04% $905 
10  $51,223  South Korea  3.30% $1,048 
Resource: Casualty Actuarial Society (2012) 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables N Mean STD Min Max
Reins ratio 275  0.273  0.240 0 0.971 
Reins_com_ratio 275  0.025  0.093 0 0.807 
Reins_vol_ratio 275  0.247  0.234 0 0.971 
Reins_tre_ratio 157  0.174  0.070 0 0.837
Reins_fac_ratio 157  0.059  0.174 0 0.668
Per_fac_reins_ratio 157  0.200  0.450 0 1 
Ownership 275  0.444  0.498 0 1 
Risk 275  0.330  0.209 0 1.401 
Bus_Leverage 275  2.894  6.598 0 66.075 
Fin_Leverage 275  0.576  0.250 0.018 0.984 
Ln(na) 275  7.321  1.375 4.477 11.388 
Tax_ex 275  0.011  0.145 -1.517 1.722 
ROA 275  -0.128  1.708 -28.322 0.136 
Herfindahl 275  0.539  0.209 0.196 1 
Long-tail 275  0.353  0.280 0 0.981 
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for variables included in this study. Reins ratio is measured as ratio of 
reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct premiums written plus reinsurance assumed. Reins_com_ratio is 
measured as compulsory reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct premiums written plus reinsurance assumed. 
Reins_vol_ratio is measured as non-compulsory reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct premiums written 
plus reinsurance assumed. Reins_tre_ratio is measured as treaty reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct 
premiums written plus reinsurance assumed. Reins_fac_ratio is measured as facultative reinsurance ceded divided 
by the sum of direct premiums written plus reinsurance assumed. Per_fac_reins_ratio is percentage of facultative 
reinsurance ratio divided by the sum of treaty reinsurance ratio plus facultative reinsurance ratio. Ownership is the 
ownership structure variable, which is a binary variable: 1 = foreign insurers, 0 = otherwise. The proxy of risk 
measure variable is loss ratio. The loss ratio is defined as the ratio of loss incurred plus loss expenses incurred 
divided by premiums income. Bus_Leverage (business leverage) is measured as the premium income divided by 
surplus ratio. Fin_Leverage (Financial leverage) is liability to assets ratio. Ln(na) is the natural logarithm of net 
admitted assets. Tax_ex is defined as the ratio of tax divided by premiums. ROA is net income on admitted assets. 
Herfindahl is Herfindahl index = Σ(PWi/TPW) ^2, where PWi is the value of premiums in line i, and TPW is the 
insurer’s premiums income. Long-tail is percentage of premiums in long-tail lines (enterprise property casualty 
insurance and liability insurance) to total premiums income.  
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Table 3 Correlation Coefficients of Variables 
 
Variables| Ownership Risk Bus_ leverage 
Fin_ 
Leverage Ln(na) Tax_ex ROA 
Her- 
findahl 
Long
-tail
Ownership 1 
Risk -0.424 1 
Bus_leverage  
0.000 
-0.147 0.222 1
Fin_Leverage  
0.018 0.000 
-0.482 0.494 0.263 1
Ln(na) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
-0.618 0.491 0.155 0.674 1
Tax_ex 
0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000 
0.020 0.039 -0.014 -0.007 -0.055 1
ROA 
0.745 0.535 0.828 0.909 0.374 
-0.106 0.224 -0.060 0.048 0.284 -0.075 1 
Herfindahl 
0.089 0.000 0.337 0.446 0.000 0.228 
-0.024 -0.004 -0.111 -0.003 0.092 0.018 0.141 1 
Long-tail 
0.699 0.951 0.075 0.957 0.140 0.775 0.023 
0.014 0.126 0.086 0.084 0.035 -0.041 -0.058 -0.493 1
0.824 0.043 0.167 0.180 0.581 0.512 0.356 0.000 
Notes: This table presents correlation coefficients. Ownership is the ownership structure variable, which is a binary 
variable: 1 = foreign insurers, 0 = otherwise. The proxy of risk measure variable is loss ratio. The loss ratio is 
defined as the ratio of loss incurred plus loss expenses incurred divided by premiums income. Bus_Leverage 
(business leverage) is measured as the premium income divided by surplus ratio. Fin_Leverage (financial leverage) 
is liability to assets ratio. Ln(na) is the natural logarithm of net admitted assets. Tax_ex is defined as the ratio of tax 
divided by premiums. ROA is net income on admitted assets. Herfindahl is Herfindahl index = Σ(PWi/TPW) ^2, 
where PWi is the value of premiums in line i, and TPW is the insurer’s premiums income. Long-tail is percentage of 
premiums in long-tail lines (enterprise property casualty insurance and liability insurance) to total premiums 
income.  
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Table 4 Regressions Results of Reinsurance Demand from Reinsurance Ratio, 
Compulsory Reinsurance Ratio and Volunteer Reinsurance Ratio from 
2004 to 2011 
 
Dependent variables Reins ratio Reins_com_ratio Reins_vol_ratio 
Independent Variables Estimate P value Estimate P value Estimate P value 
Ownership 0.113 ** 0.041 0.004 0.800 0.144 *** 0.008 
Risk -0.015 0.748 -0.033 0.347 -0.038 0.520 
Bus_Leverage -0.002 0.324 0.000 0.947 -0.001 0.581 
Fin_Leverage -0.065 0.197 0.058 0.101 -0.074 0.243 
Ln(na) -0.038 *** 0.009 -0.012 0.117 -0.015 0.381 
Tax_ex -0.126 ** 0.019 0.007 0.860 -0.142 ** 0.036 
ROA 0.383 *** 0.001 0.173 ** 0.031 0.245 * 0.099 
Herfindahl 0.046 0.393 0.024 0.481 0.023 0.731 
Longtail -0.018 0.576 -0.005 0.850 -0.006 0.892 
Intercept 0.528 *** 0.000 0.079 0.142 0.339 *** 0.006 
Hausman test 54.8 8.56 30.86 
R-Square 0.251 0.042 0.231 
N 275 275 275 
Notes: This table shows the regression results for reinsurance demand from reinsurance ratio, compulsory 
reinsurance ratio and volunteer reinsurance ratio on ownership structure and risk from 2004 to 2011. Dependent 
variables including Reins ratio, Reins_com_ratio and Reins_vol_ratio. Reins ratio is measured as ratio of 
reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct premiums written plus reinsurance assumed. Reins_com_ratio is 
measured as compulsory reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct premiums written plus reinsurance assumed. 
Reins_vol_ratio is measured as non-compulsory reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct premiums written 
plus reinsurance assumed. Independent variables include ownership structures, risk and firms’ characteristics 
variables. Ownership is the ownership structure variable, which is a binary variable: 1 = foreign insurers, 0 = 
otherwise. The proxy of risk measure variable is loss ratio. The loss ratio is defined as the ratio of loss incurred plus 
loss expenses incurred divided by premiums income. Bus_Leverage (business leverage) is measured as the premium 
income divided by surplus ratio. Fin_Leverage (financial leverage) is liability to assets ratio. Ln(na) is the natural 
logarithm of net admitted assets. Tax_ex is defined as the ratio of tax divided by premiums. ROA is net income on 
admitted assets. Herfindahl is Herfindahl index = Σ(PWi/TPW) ^2, where PWi is the value of premiums in line i, 
and TPW is the insurer’s premiums income. Long-tail is percentage of premiums in long-tail lines (enterprise 
property casualty insurance and liability insurance) to total premiums income. All models are random effect models. 
***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
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Table 5 Regressions Results of Reinsurance Demand from Treaty Reinsurance 
Ratio, Facultative Reinsurance Ratio and Percentage of Facultative 
Reinsurance Ratio from 2008 to 2011 
 
Dependent variables Reins_tre_ratio Reins_fac_ratio Per_fac_reins_ratio 
Independent Variables Estimate P value Estimate P value Estimate P value 
Ownership 0.072 0.174 0.056 0.112 0.159 ** 0.026 
Risk -0.054 0.260 0.010 0.741 -0.085 0.456 
Bus_Leverage -0.003 ** 0.016 0.000 0.695 0.002 0.513 
Fin_Leverage 0.050 0.404 -0.017 0.663 0.004 0.977 
Ln(na) -0.022 0.253 -0.025 **  0.042 0.023 0.472 
Tax_ex -0.218 *** 0.000 -0.026 0.462 -0.003 0.985 
ROA 0.127 0.329 0.039 0.641 -0.129 0.652 
Herfindahl 0.074  
 
0.190 -0.024  
 
0.510 0.021  
 
0.860 
Long-tail 0.049      0.184 0.005 0.846 0.010 0.899 
Intercept 0.252 *  0.081 0.243 *** 0.010 0.713 *** 0.003 
Hausman test 33.740 19.540 13.240 
R-Square 0.115 0.225 0.170 
N 157  157 157 
Notes: This table shows the regression results for reinsurance demand from reinsurance ratio, compulsory 
reinsurance ratio and volunteer reinsurance ratio on ownership structure and risk from 2004 to 2011. Dependent 
variables including Reins_fac_ratio, Reins_tre_ratio and Per_fac_reins_ratio. Reins_tre_ratio is measured as treaty 
reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct premiums written plus reinsurance assumed. Reins_fac_ratio is 
measured as facultative reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct premiums written plus reinsurance assumed. 
Per_fac_reins_ratio is percentage of facultative reinsurance ratio divided by the sum of treaty reinsurance ratio plus 
facultative reinsurance ratio. Independent variables include ownership structures, risk and firms’ characteristics 
variables. Ownership is the ownership structure variable, which is a binary variable: 1 = foreign insurers, 0 = 
otherwise. The proxy of risk measure variable is loss ratio. The loss ratio is defined as the ratio of loss incurred plus 
loss expenses incurred divided by premiums income. Bus_Leverage (business leverage) is measured as the premium 
income divided by surplus ratio. Fin_Leverage (financial leverage) is 1 minus surplus-to-assets ratio. Ln(na) is the 
natural logarithm of net admitted assets. Tax_ex is defined as the ratio of tax divided by premiums. ROA is net 
income on admitted assets. Herfindahl is Herfindahl index = Σ(PWi/TPW) ^2, where PWi is the value of premiums 
in line i, and TPW is the insurer’s premiums income. Long-tail is percentage of premiums in long-tail lines 
(enterprise property casualty insurance and liability insurance) to total premiums income. All models are random 
effect models. ***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
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Table 6 Results of Reinsurance Demand for Reinsurance Ratio in 2004 and over 
period from 2006 to 2011 
Model Model A Model Model B 
Dependent variables: 
Reins ratio 
2004 Sample 
Dependent variables: 
Reins ratio  
2006-2011 Sample 
Independent Variables   Estimate P value Independent Variables Estimate P value 
Ownership -0.196 0.406 Ownership 0.181 *** 0.001 
Risk -0.227 0.580 Risk 0.006 0.897 
Bus_Leverage -0.009 0.680 Bus_Leverage -0.002 0.117 
Fin_Leverage -0.701 * 0.098 Fin_Leverage -0.01 0.862 
Ln(na) -0.012 0.857 Ln(na) -0.019 0.281 
Tax_ex -1.475 0.710 Tax_ex -0.215 *** 0.002 
ROA 1.772 0.398 ROA 0.294 ** 0.019 
Herfindahl -0.044 0.889 Herfindahl 0.011 0.844 
Long-tail 0.234 0.479 Long-tail -0.016 0.635 
Intercept 0.987 * 0.093 Intercept 0.328 ** 0.013 
Hausman test 54.8 
R-Square 0.147 R-Square 0.025 
N 22 N 259  
This table shows the regression results for reinsurance demand from reinsurance ratio on ownership structure and 
risk in two subsamples: 2004 sample in Model A and from 2006 to 2011 sample in Model B. Dependent variables is 
Reins ratio. Reins raito is measured as ratio of reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct premiums written plus 
reinsurance assumed. Independent variables include ownership structures, risk and firms’ characteristics variables. 
Ownership is the ownership structure variable, which is a binary variable: 1 = foreign insurers, 0 = otherwise. The 
proxy of risk measure variable is loss ratio. The loss ratio is defined as the ratio of loss incurred plus loss expenses 
incurred divided by premiums income. Bus_Leverage (business leverage) is measured as the premium income 
divided by surplus ratio. Fin_Leverage (financial leverage) is 1 minus surplus-to-assets ratio. Ln(na) is the natural 
logarithm of net admitted assets. Tax_ex is defined as the ratio of tax divided by premiums. ROA is net income on 
admitted assets. Herfindahl is Herfindahl index = Σ(PWi/TPW) ^2, where PWi is the value of premiums in line i, 
and TPW is the insurer’s premiums income. Long-tail is percentage of premiums in long-tail lines (enterprise 
property casualty insurance and liability insurance) to total premiums income. Model A uses OLS model, because 
the model includes data for only one year (2004). Model B is a random effect models. ***significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
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Table 7 Chow Test Results of Reinsurance Demand from Reinsurance Ratio, 
Compulsory Reinsurance Ceded and Volunteer Reinsurance Ceded in 
2004 and from 2006 to 2011 
 
Dependent variables 
Reins_ratio Reins_com_ratio Reins_vol_ratio 
Independent Variables Estimate P value Estimate P value Estimate P value
Group 2004 1.097 ** 0.024 0.057 0.456 0.919 ** 0.048 
Ownership 2004 -0.197 0.337 0.007 0.836 -0.125 0.524 
Risk 2004  -0.185 0.607 0.007 0.903 -0.285 0.409 
Bus_Leverage 2004 -0.013 0.502 -0.003 0.282 -0.009 0.649 
Fin_Leverage 2004 -0.666 ** 0.057 0.011 0.845 -0.666 0.047 
Ln(na) 2004 -0.024 0.691 -0.002 0.871 -0.006 0.914 
Tax_ex 2004 -2.571 0.463 0.390 0.484 -1.933 0.564 
ROA 2004 2.142 0.239 -0.175 0.545 1.513 0.385 
Herfindahl 2004 -0.122 0.660 0.017 0.705 -0.185 0.485 
Long-tail 2004  0.298 0.303 0.041 0.371 0.179 0.517 
Group 2006-2011 0.404 *** 0.004 0.014 0.530 0.366 *** 0.007 
Ownership 2006-2011 0.152 *** 0.000 -0.002 0.699 0.154 *** 0.000 
Risk 2006-2011 -0.148 * 0.099 -0.007 0.644 -0.138 0.106 
Bus_Leverage 2006-2011 0.002 0.485 0.000 0.865 0.002 0.447 
Fin_Leverage 2006-2011 0.228 ** 0.015 0.004 0.778 0.216 ** 0.016 
Ln(na) 2006-2011 -0.050 *** 0.009 -0.003 0.367 -0.045 ** 0.014 
Tax_ex 2006-2011 -0.161 0.260 -0.004 0.863 -0.164 0.229 
ROA 2006-2011 0.595 *** 0.004 0.013 0.695 0.593 *** 0.003 
Herfindahl 2006-2011 0.092 0.286 0.021 0.126 0.089 0.283 
Long-tail 2006-2011 0.031 0.624 0.001 0.959 0.038 0.532 
 ( 1) Ownership 2004 - Ownership 2006-2011 = 0 
 ( 2) Risk 2004 -Rsik 2006-2011 = 0 
 ( 3) Bus_Leverage 2004 - Bus_Leverage 2006-2011 = 0 
 ( 4) Fin_Leverage 2004 - Fin_Leverage 2006-2011 = 0 
 ( 5)Ln(na) 2004 - Ln(na) 2006-2011 = 0 
 ( 6) Tax_ex 2004 - Tax_ex 2006-2011 = 0 
 ( 7) ROA 2004 - ROA 2006-2011 = 0 
 ( 8) Herfindahl 2004 -Herfindahl 2006-2011 = 0 
 ( 9) Long-tail 2004 - Long-tail 2006-2011 = 0 
 (10) Group 2004 - Group 2006-2011 = 0 
F (10, 239) = 1.720 * 6.630 *** 1.950 
Prob > F = 0.076 0.000 0.164 
N 244 244     244     
Notes: This table shows the chow test results for reinsurance demand from reinsurance ratio, compulsory 
reinsurance ratio and volunteer reinsurance ratio for two group samples. There are two group samples include 2004 
sample and 2006-2011 sample. Dependent variables including Reins ratio, Reins_com_ratio and Reins_vol_ratio. 
Reins ratio is measured as ratio of reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct premiums written plus reinsurance 
assumed. Reins_com_ratio is measured as compulsory reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct premiums 
written plus reinsurance assumed. Reins_vol_ratio is measured as non-compulsory reinsurance ceded divided by the 
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sum of direct premiums written plus reinsurance assumed. Independent variables include ownership structures, risk 
and firms’ characteristics variables. Ownership is the ownership structure variable, which is a binary variable: 1 = 
foreign insurers, 0 = otherwise. The proxy of risk measure variable is loss ratio. The loss ratio is defined as the ratio 
of loss incurred plus loss expenses incurred divided by premiums income. Bus_Leverage (business leverage) is 
measured as the premium income divided by surplus ratio. Fin_Leverage (financial leverage) is liability to assets 
ratio. Ln(na) is the natural logarithm of net admitted assets. Tax_ex is defined as the ratio of tax divided by 
premiums. ROA is net income on admitted assets. Herfindahl is Herfindahl index = Σ(PWi/TPW) ^2, where PWi is 
the value of premiums in line i, and TPW is the insurer’s premiums income. Long-tail is percentage of premiums in 
long-tail lines (enterprise property casualty insurance and liability insurance) to total premiums income. 
***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
